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1. INTRODUCTION
It is my greatest privilege commenting on Professor Souders’ deconstructive work
on rhetorical and argumentative invention at this occasion. The work is indeed wellinformed and ambitious; I also had a lot of pleasure and fun reading it.
Reading through the paper, what I find particularly notable and refreshing is
two-fold. First, he reminds us that “argumentative invention lies in a between-ness
of arguer and audience.” While this may sound obvious and self-evident to most
students of rhetoric and argument, it is not necessarily so when it comes to the
characterization, understanding and interpretation of invention current in our field.
To borrow O’Keefe’s (1982) classic distinction, in discussing invention many of us
seem to privilege argument1 over argument2. In other words, assuming that the
“making of argument” is the most paradigmatic case of arguing, we generally expect
(and do so rightly) invention to be completed or finished (with the help of dialectics
or topoi) before we start “having of argument,” namely prior to our engagement in
argumentative interaction with others. Given this, the paper works as a fresh
reminder to many of us: For arguers, invention is not (just) a “prep” or “homework,”
i.e., the necessary precondition for persuading audience by making argument; it is
also what that takes place at the very moment of having argument with their
interlocutors, whether (a)live, dead, real, potential, or imaginary.
Second, drawing on the work of such scholars as Derrida and Caputo,
Professor Souders introduces us to the notion of khôra, a place of non-place where
rhetorical invention takes place “as [our] language fails to operate in the way we
want.” He tells us that our everyday experience is full of eventful surprises and that
“[t]hese small inventions—the moment when we bump against the limit of language
or ideas—are signals…. of the idea of the ‘newness.’ Every small surprise, every
event of everyday invention wherein something is made new by the difference of
language is linked back the possibility of a ‘new’ itself—a possibility that lies within
the potential of language as well as within its limit.” While students of argument are
well-accustomed to, and are rather actively engaged in, the study of a “big surprise”
or “accident,” e.g., a rhetorical crisis that “does not so much ‘invite’ discourse as defy
it” (Farrell & Goodnight, 1981, p. 273), to the best of my knowledge, not many of us
in the field seem to seriously attend to these smaller inventions that Professor
Souders highlights, namely, idiomatic surprises and events inherent in our everyday
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language use. Again, at least to people like me, the paper offers a fresh perspective
on rhetorical invention in this regard. He assures us not to be so super-defensive
and –apologetic about what we (fail to) do in the name of invention, namely, our
effort/failure to create and say something original, unique and new.
2. KHÔRA, TOPOI AND ARCHIVE
Wishing to more fully appreciate and further extend the deconstructive move
Professor Souders made, in the remainder of this commentary, I would like to
pursue and share with you some of my own personal concerns and interest
regarding how we should go about the notion of rhetorical and argumentative
invention in our times.
In the first place, I am interested in hearing more about Professor Souders’
take on the concept of topoi and, by extension, of what Derrida and Foucault call
“archive,” in relation of his deconstruction of invention. As he correctly observes,
students of rhetoric and argument are “overburdened by the history of studies in
invention.” And provided that “the concept of topics [has] occupied a central place in
theories of rhetoric and invention” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 578), we cannot but (and feel
obliged to) talk about topoi whenever we discuss invention just as others do in the
field. “Whether as a storehouse of clichés and aphorisms, a procedure for
uncovering warrants, a method for discovering things to say about a specific topic,
or a concept with interpretive value, topics or commonplaces remain interest to
rhetorical scholars” (Jasinski, 2001, p. 589).
Speaking more specifically, I think I am posing a couple of related questions
here. First has to do with the issue of “parasite/supplement.” Is “bastard reasoning”
in khôra parasitic to the topical system where no surprise is a norm when it comes
to rhetorical invention? Or, just as Derrida’s (1977) “[d]ifférance,… the most ‘eventridden’ utterance” (p. 19) is, is it this very event of language that enables us to
genuinely proceed and invent something “new,” making the topical system rather
supplementary to it? If I am reading the paper correctly, what Professor Souders has
proposed therein is not a “radical criticism”: It is a “supplement, not a replacement,”
of what we know about invention. At the same time, I wonder if there is any
possibility that his deconstruction of the “spatial metaphor” could replace topoi with
khôra both in the theory and practice of rhetorical argumentation. Namely, does the
highlighting on these “small inventions” we encounter and are engaged in everyday
have a potential to reconfigure or partially alter our theoretical discourse about
topoi? If not, what is the status of these small inventions? Are they supposed to
remain “merely accidental” hence cause “no damage” to the topical system of
invention?
This is precisely where the second set of my questions or concerns kicks in.
More often than not, I feel as if my everyday operation were within a certain system;
whatever I do and say becomes connected or becomes part of a larger formation of
discourses and deeds that allows little, if not no, event-hood of event. To me at least,
that system has (almost) become what Derrida and Foucault call “archive.” For
Foucault, archive is not merely a library but “the system of discursivity that
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establishes the possibility of what can be said” (Manoff, 2004, p. 18). Writing of the
“topo-nomological” function of archive, Derrida (1995) further states:
As is the case for the Latin archivum or archium…, the meaning of “archive,” its only
meaning, comes to it from the Greek arkheion: initially a house, a domicile, an
address, the residence of the superior magistrates, the archons, those who
commanded. The citizens who thus held and signified political power were
considered to possess the right to make or represent the law. On account to their
publicly recognized authority, it is at their home, in that place which is their house…
that official documents are filed. The archons are first of all the documents’
guardians…. They are also accorded the hermeneutic right and competence. They
have the power to interpret the archives. Entrusted to such archons, these
documents in effect speak the law; they call the law and call on or impose the law.
(p. 2; also see Lane, 2003)

This is particularly true when it comes to our engagement in rhetoric and
argumentation through electric media. In the age of the Internet and digital media,
most of what we say are first saved, then cached and finally archived. “The constant
and ever-present archivization of one's self places extraordinary value in the past or
what has happened or will happen and then be done with, so it must be
remembered and then re-remembered and re-archived… [A] blog can be deleted but
someone could have a file or screen shot of the blog, or have printed it off, etc.”
(Sloan, 2012). Derrida (1995) thus writes about our modern-day archive against the
backdrop of the technological advancement and the “geo-techno-logic shocks” it has
caused (p.16). He notes that this “archival earthquake” has drastically transformed
the nature of communication and of production of knowledge “in its very event,” for
the archive… is not only the place for stocking and for conserving an archivable
content of the past… [T]he technical structure of the archiving archive also
determines the structure of the archivable content in its very coming into existence
and in its relationship to the future. The archivization produces as much as it
records the event. (pp. 16-17)

I am concerned that this sort of archive, our modern-day topical system, is ever
expanding and as inclusive as ever. And I wonder if Professor Souders’
deconstruction of invention and the idea of khôra can help alleviate my concern,
empowering me to resist the ever increasing “archontic power [that] gathers the
functions of unification, of identification, of classification” (Derrida, 1995, p. 3) of all
that occur in the sphere of linguistic communication.
3. INVENTION AS MIMESIS
And, yet, there is one more thing. There were times in our history when rhetorical
and argumentative invention had little to do with the discursive production of
something new, unique and original. From an ancient Greek city-state of Athens
through the Middle-Ages and the Renaissance (c.f., Clark, 1956; Gilbert, 1936),
rhetorical education valued what is called mimesis and orators were trained in the
art of imitation. In the words of Henry Peacham, the pseudonym used by two
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English Renaissance writers, mimesis “is an imitation of speech whereby the Orator
counterfaitech not onely what one said, but also his vtterance, pronunciation and
gesture, imitating euery thing as it was, which is alwaies well performed, and
naturally represented in an apt and skilful actor” (quoted in Plett, 2005, p. 271).
More specifically, students of rhetoric know that mimesis is integral to, and
plays an indispensable role in, rhetorical invention at least in two senses. First it
helps rhetors craft and produce good discourse. In the words of Leff (1997),
imitation “is not the mere repetition or mechanistic reproduction of something
found in an existing text. It is a complex process that allows historical texts to serve
as equipment for future rhetorical production” (p.201). Second, and perhaps more
important, invention is not just about the crafting of good discourse; it is rather or
also the nurturing and cultivation of human character, i.e., the invention of Cicero’s
and Quintilian’s “good wo/man who speaks well.” Indeed, such idea of rhetoric and
pedagogical ideal, or what ancient Greeks called paideia, have very little to do with
the narrow conception of invention, i.e., discovering or producing something new,
unique and original. “The general Greek idea, that education is the process by which
the whole man is shaped, is enunciated independently of Plato, and variously
expounded in such imagery as ‘model’ or ‘pattern,’… ‘stamp,’… ‘imitate’” (Jeager,
1944, p. 64).
As the most successful teacher of rhetoric in classical Athens, Isocrates is
arguably the most significant champion of paideia. Isocrates was deeply skeptical of
dialogue and dialectics, the method of teaching that Plato, his archrival, professed.
For him, such “gymnastic of mind” can hardly be entitled “philosophy”; it is at best a
“preparation for philosophy” (p. 333), where he reserved the term “philosophy” for
what he himself practiced, i.e., the teaching of rhetorical eloquence. He spoke thus:
I consider that the kind of art which can implant honesty and justice in depraved
natures has never existed and does not exist… But I do hold that people can become
better and worthier if they conceive an ambition to speak well, if they become
possessed of the desire to be able to persuade their hearers…. [T]he power to speak
well and think right will reward the man who approaches the art of discourse with
love of wisdom and love of honour. Furthermore, mark you, the man who wishes to
persuade people will not be negligent as to the matter of character; no, on the
contrary, he will apply himself above all to establish a most honourable name
among his fellow-citizens; for who does not know that words carry greater
conviction when spoken by men of good rupture than when spoken by men who live
under a cloud… Therefore, the stronger a man’s desire to persuade his hearers, the
more zealously will he strive to be honourable and to have the esteem of his fellowcitizens. (pp. 337-339)

More importantly, neither through dialectics nor written manuals, his only method
of teaching and of invention was through imitation. Unlike Aristotle and others, he
left no theoretical treatises on rhetoric. What he left is only the text of his own
speeches. Isocrates “clings to the principle of imitation established by his
predecessors… for all his great speeches were meant to be ‘models’ in which his
pupils could study the precepts of his art” (Jaeger, 1944, p. 65, italics in original).
It is clear by now that the idea of invention as new, unique, and original, i.e.,
what we can call “invention-as-innovation,” is relatively new; it is hardly the one and
4
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only meaning assigned to that term. Drawing of the work of René Girard, our own
Isocrates and a modern-day champion of imitation, Vandenberg (2011) states that
the birth of the Romantic Movement and the rise of science and technology are two
key factors that contributed to the emergence of invention-as-innovation and the
decline of invention-as-imitation. Muckelbauer (2003) also writes that imitation,
once the most celebrated and popular approach to rhetorical invention and
teaching, was a victim of “the institutional emergence of romantic subjectivity, an
ethos that emphasized creativity, originality, and genius” (p. 62).
And it is at this point that I would like to go back to Professor Souders paper.
While I agree that “we remain overburdened by the history of studies in invention
and more particularly in the history of ideas themselves,” I also find some of these
(past) studies and discourses about invention refreshing and quite liberating. In
other words, the concept of invention has a “usable tradition”; the argument from its
history deconstructs itself (c.f., Cox, 1990). As Professor Souders has Derrida say,
the “[p]roblem of rhetoric—particular of the possibility of naming—is… no mere
side issues.” And mimesis is the name that gives us another reason that we do not
have to be so apologetic or defensive about what we do as/about invention.
Perhaps, students of rhetoric should acknowledge, as McGee and Lyne (1987)
suggest, that the way they argue about rhetoric and the term they use to name it will
“in part determine what will be counted as an increment of the ‘knowledge’ they are
supposed to produce and preserve” (p. 382). Or, perhaps we students of rhetoric
rather owe our big apology to invention itself, not because we fail to discover
something new or create something original but because we have not paid serious
attention to its history?
4. CONCLUSIONS
It is obvious by now that, in this commentary, what I attempted is nothing original
or unique. I have to say that there is little, if not no, original or unique about what I
have said. In the first place, I did not “originate” this discourse; I was merely
responding and reacting to what Professor Souders wrote. Second, what I have
given to you here is based upon and largely informed by what others have already
said and written about invention.
Do I have to be apologetic? I hope not.
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